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THE FLOATING ZONE: LEGAL STATUS
AND APPLICATION TO GASOLINE STATIONSt
Benjamin Mosher*
A relatively new concept in zoning which has been receiving
a considerable amount of attention from the courts and from professional planners is that of the floating zone or the unlocated use
Mr. Mosher was awarded his district. What makes this concept
LL.B. in 1932, and LL.M. in 1939, of particular interest and controfrom Brooklyn Law School. He versy is its departure from the trareceived the degree of Master of ditional ideas of zoning which have
Public Administration from New gained wide acceptance since the
York University in 1941. He has decision in Euclid v. Ambler Realty
served as Vice Chairman of the
Advisory Committee, New York Co.,' which upheld zoning as a
State Petroleum Council, and was proper exercise of the police power.
a member of the 'New York City Following the Euclid decision, the
Zoning Advisory Council. He is pattern of z o n in g ordinances
presently an attorney for Cities throughout the country has been
to regulate 1 a n d use, building
Service Oil Company.
height and lot area by dividing governmental units into territorial
districts with fixed boundaries. Often, because of peculiar circumstances, the literal application of an ordinance results in practical
difficulty or unnecessary hardship. In such cases, zoning boards
are empowered to grant variances from the strict letter of the ordinance involved. Further flexibility in the administration of a
zoning ordinance has been accomplished by way of special exceptions or special use permits. Such exceptions are granted for specified uses in designated zones upon compliance with standards set
out in the ordinance for each of such uses. The basic theory underlying such ordinances is that the boundaries of all districts are
fixed either by maps or metes and bounds descriptions, so that
property owners or prospective purchasers know exactly how their
properties are classified for zoning purposes.
The device of the floating zone, which has also been referred
to as the sinking zone or delayed zoning or two-step zoning, introduces an entirely new concept in that the location of such a zone
is not initially fixed. This technique is employed to create a particular type of use district which at the time is not geographically
delineated, but which can be subsequently located by petition of
a property owner desiring to develop his tract for a particular use.
t Based on a paper presented at the Petroleum Industry Marketing Attorneys

meeting, Chicago, Illinois, August, 1963.
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Such a zone floats over the entire governmental unit in no definite
position until it is brought down to earth by a rezoning amendment
which fixes its boundaries. Ironically, this new concept in land planning is in a sense anomalous with planning, since the governmental
planning body no longer takes the initiative in planning land development; but permits the plan to be patterned by petitioning
property owners.
It is the purpose of this article to consider the legal aspects
of the floating zone device, the views of planners on the subject,
and the applicability of the concept to the gasoline service station
use. There has been a growing tendency to employ this zoning
method for locating shopping centers, large-scale apartment developments, and even gasoline service stations, despite the conflict
of authority on its legal status. Therefore, the question of the legality of this device is one of real interest to zoning practitioners
generally, as well as to marketing attorneys of petroleum companies.
RODGERS V. TARRYTOWN
A leading case on the floating zone, and perhaps the earliest,
is that of Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytom.2 This case involved the
validity of an ordinance and an implementing amendment of a
suburban area near New York City. The 1947 ordinance created a
new class of residential zone designated as "Residence B-B" for
multiple family garden-type apartments. The 1948 amendment
rezoned certain property over ten acres, on application of its
owner, from a Residence A district for single family dwellings to
the new Residence B-B district. The 1947 ordinance setting up this
floating zone contained strict limitations as to a minimum lot size
of ten acres, setbacks, and spacing of buildings. It also provided
the mechanics to fix the boundaries of such district by the Village
Board through the process of amendment to the zoning map on
application of a property owner.
The fundamental question involved in the Tarrytown case was
that of compliance with the state enabling act's requirements that
the regulation be "in accordance with a comprehensive plan" 8 and
that the division of the Village into districts "be of such number,
shape and area as may be deemed best suited."4 The prevailing
opinion failed to explain what "a comprehensive plan" was. In this
connection, it was pointed out merely that the creation of the
new zone was justified by the need for additional housing facilities
for young families to prevent their moving elsewhere, the desire
to alleviate the tax burden on small home owners, etc. The major1272 U.S. 365 (1926).
2 302 "N.Y.115,96 N.E.2d 731 (1951).
3 N. Y.VILLAGE LAW § 177.
4 N.Y.ViLLAGE LAW § 176.
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ity held that the amendments, "read together as they must be",5
satisfied the statutory requirements."
On the other hand, the minority of the court took the view that
the Village Board did not have any "plan, comprehensive or otherwise,"7 and that the procedure employed, since it eliminated board
initiative, was the very opposite of "comprehensive planning by
the board."" Moreover, the dissent argued that the 1947 amendment
was defective for failure to comply with the requirement of the
Village Law as to district divisions, in that establishment of zoning
boundaries was implicit in such requirement."
The prevailing opinion attempted to justify the floating zone
device on the basis of similarities with that of the special exception.
The latter type of use, sometimes referred to as a special peftmit
use or a conditional use, is one which the legislative body finds to
be generally compatible with other uses permitted in a particular
zoning district, but not at every location therein nor under all
circumstances. Accordingly, a special exception ordinance affords
flexibility to a zoning pattern by permitting a certain use conditionally, the condition being that the dispensing agency determine
compliance with specified standards which are tailored to fit the
special problems which the use presents. Oddly enough, the prevailing opinion did not refer to the special exception technique by
name, but instead repeatedly cited a case involving this device,
Nappi v. LaGuardia.0 In Nappi, there was upheld an amendment
to the New York City zoning ordinance. This amendment added
by way of a special exception, to the uses permitted as of right in
a residential district, one for administrative offices and industrial
laboratory projects if subsequently approved on the basis of prescribed standards.
5 302 N. Y. at 125, 96 N.E.2d at 736 (1951).
6Recently quoted and followed in Rogers v. North American Phillips Co.,
37 Misc.2d 923, 928, 236 N.Y.S.2d 744, 751 (1962), af-f'd 19 App.Div.2d 838,
245 N.Y.S.2d 995 (Sup. Ct. 1963). That case involved dismissal of a complaint which challenged the validity of rezoning of a 74-acre parcel from
residential to a new floating zone designated "Planned Office Building and
Research Laboratory District.
7302 N.Y. at 128, 96 N.E.2d at 737.
8 Ibid.
9 Referring to § 176 of the Village Law, the court minority said at 302
N.Y. 127, 96 N.E.2d at 737 (1951), that: "The plain import of that language
is that after the hoard has exercised its power to 'divide the village into
districts,' there should result a number of physically ascertainable districts,
each having a definite 'shape' and 'area. Obviously, the board of trustees,
in enacting the 1947 ordinance, did mnot 'divide' the village into districts;"the
board merely assigned a name or title to a district which might some day be
created. As a result of that ordinance, no one could tell whether there would
ever be any 'Residence B-B Districts', or, if so, what their number, shape
and area might be. Thus, the reference in the ordinance to 'districts' or
'zones' is meaningless, for it is impossible to have a true 'district' or 'zone'
without specified boundaries."
10 184 Misc. 775, 55 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1944), aff'd 269 App.Div. 693, 54
N.Y.S.2d 722 (1945), aff'd 295 N.Y. 652, 64 N.E.2d 716 (1945).

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1964

3

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 1 [1964], Iss. 2, Art. 4

TULSA LAW JOURNAL
['Vol. 1, No. 2
The prevailing opinion in Tarrytoum "conceded that, under the
method which the board did adopt, no one will know, from the
1947 ordinance itself, precisely where a Residence B-B district '*ifU
ultimately be located."'1 The court majority then argued that the
"same uncertainty" 2 would have been present if the Nappi type of
ordinance had been enacted in the Village of Tarrytown "and
yet there would be no doubt as to the propriety of that procedure."'3
Rejecting this comparison, the dissent distinguished the Tarrytown
case from Nappi in that:
"A person purchasing property in New York City in the
designated residence district would be on notice that the additional use was authorized. He may examine the zoning ordinance and discover, with certainty, all the permitted uses to
which the adjoining property could be put. On the contrary,
a person purchasing property in Tarrytown in a Residence A
or B district to bring up his children now has no way of
knowing whether the property next to his may or may not
become the site of a multiple family dwelling with the attendant increases4 in population, traffic dangers, commerce
and congestion."1

As further justification for upholding the Tarrytown ordinance,
despite its failure to afford notice to property owners of the precise
location of the new zoning district, the court majority referred to
the nature of the use involved there, saying: 'But since such a
district is simply a garden apartment development, we find nothing unusual or improper in that circumstance. "" Such reasoning
is not sound, since judicial acceptance of the floating zone concept
in the case of the innocuous use may furnish a legal precedent for
acceptance of other uses more objectionable. This could lead to
erosion of the sound principles of zoning regardless of the effect
of the implementation of the concept in the case involved.
A more fundamental criticism of the Tarrytown decision is
the failure of the prevailing opinion to give consideration and effect
to the essential difference between the nature of the floating zbne
and that of the special exception as represented by the Nappi case.
As previously noted, the latter type of ordinance adds to the uses
already permitted a conditional one in all zoning districts of the
same classification, thereby making such use conditionally available to all property owners in that type of district. Neither the
ordinance creating the special exception nor implementation thereof
entails any change of zoning classification. On the other hand, the
floating zone ordinance awaits applications by property owners
throughout the entire governmental unit, regardless of the zone
"1302 N.Y. at 126, 96 N.E.2d at 736.
.2Ibid.

13 Ibd.
'4 Id. at 130, 96 N.E.2d at 738.

15 Id. at 126. 96 N.E.2d at 736.
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in which the property is located, for rezoning from one classification to another. Since implementation of the floating zone ordinance
requires a zoning change, it often raises the question of spot zoning, particularly where small parcels are involved.
This basic dissimilarity between a special exception and rezoning, as well as the danger of spot zoning inherent in the latter,
is demonstrated in the very case of Nappi v. LaGuardia, so frequently referred to in the prevailing opinion in Tarrytown. It appears from the cited opinion that, at the time of the enactment of
the amendment authorizing the special exception, objections were
voiced with respect to the general effect of the amendment rather
than with reference to the defendant's project in particular. That
court, per Froessel, J., indicated that if the city had tried to confine
the proposed use merely to defendant's property, by way of a
rezoning amendment, such an attempt would have constituted spot
zoning. The court said:
"The minutes of the hearing before the Planning Commission
and the Board of Estimate clearly demonstrate that this amendment was intended by the municipal authorities to be citywide in scope, and many of those who appeared and objected
based their objections not upon the defendant's project but
upon the very fact that the amendment would permit such
projects on plots of ten acres or more. In other words, some
of the objectors would have countenanced 'spot zoning,' but
the municipal authorities did not Instead, -they adopted a
general amendment which does not permit in one residential
district that which is not permitted in another. All such districts became subject to the use contemplated by the amendment, if the procedure therein be followed.'"
Spot zoning has been explained "as the practice whereby a
single lot or area is granted privileges which are not granted or7
extended to other land in the vicinity in the same use district."'
The charge of spot zoning leveled at the Tarrytown ordinance was
held to be without substance on the ground that the ordinance was
in accordance with a comprehensive plan. The prevailing opinion
pointed out that if an ordinance is enacted in accordance with a
comprehensive plan, it is not spot zoning even if it "creates in the
center of a large zone small areas or districts devoted to a different
use."' 8 By coincidence, both the Tarrytown and Nappi ordinances

required ten acres as a minimum plot. 19 While the Nappi case upheld the special exception ordinance, the above quoted dictum of
the lower court clearly indicated that rezoning of the defendants
property would have constituted spot zoning. Surely the rezoning
10 184 Misc. at 780, 55 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
37 1 RATHXOPF, LAW OF ZoNN Ain PLANNmNc,
18302 N.Y. at 124, 96 N.E.2d at 735.

§ 26-1 (3d

ed. 1962).

19 Here again, the court majority in Tarrytown cited the Napp! decision

as authority that such a minimum "was well within the range of unassailable

legislative judgment." 302 N.Y. at 123, 96 N.E.2d at 734.
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hypothesized in the dictum of the Nappi case, involving the New
York City zoning ordinance, would have been as much in accordance with a comprehensive plan as the rezoning ordinance in the
Tarrytown case. The holding of th& Tarrytown decision in this respect is not only contrary to the dictum of Nappi, but is illogical
because the essential difference between the two methods does
not permit parallelism. It is difficult to conceive how a charge
of spot zoning can be sustained with respect to a special exception ordinance, regardless of the size of the parcel concerned,
since no change of zoning is involved, and since the very framework of the ordinance "does not permit in one . .. district that
which is not permitted in another (of the same classification)."20
Theoretically at least, all subject properties and all affected properties within similar zoning districts are dealt with on an even
basis in the case of a special exception, but this would not necessarily be so in the case of rezoning under a floating zone ordinance.
Indeed, as in the case of a variance, a special exception is commonly
granted for a small parcel, whereas the rezoning of small parcels
often collides with the challenge of spot zoning. 2' The court in
Tarrytown failed to recognize this distinction.
A further reason why a reclassification of zone is not analogous
to the granting of a special exception is that rezoning involves
amendment of the zoning map and is a legislative act while the
granting of a special exception is administrative or quasi-judicial.
Because of the strong presumption of validity of legislative acts,
the courts are much more reluctant to upset rezoning than to reverse administrative decisions in special exception cases. Accordingly, there is far less likelihood of judicial upset of rezoning granted on the basis of favor than there is of judicial upset of a special
exception granted on that basis. The distinction between a special
exception and rezoning is even more pointed in the event of a denial of the application. A denial of a special exception is subject
to court review, but the applicant is without any realistic relief in
the event of a refusal to legislate by way of rezoning.
The lack of availability of customary judicial review of a refusal to rezone is an extremely important point which has been
clearly demonstrated by a New York court decision last year. The
case is California Oil Co. v. Root,2 2 involving an ordinance of the
Town of Salina, New York. The zoning ordinance created a special

20 184 Misc. at 780, 55 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
21 Although the size of the parcel involved is not the only consideration,
it is an important one. See Spot Zoning and the Comprehensive Plan, 10
SYRACusE L. B Ev. 303, 305 (1958): "While the courts are quick to state that
the size of the plot alone is not sufficient to invalidate an ordinance, an examination of the cases shows that the size of the new zone is the most important single factor in determining whether a comprehensive plan has been
followed. There is a direct relation between the dimensions of the amended
area and the validity of the ordinance:' See also, 15 OKLA. L. REV. 197, 198
(1962).
22 18 App.Div.2d 873, appeal denied, 12 N.Y.2d 647, 238 N.Y.S.2d 1027
(1963).
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Commercial B District where a gasoline filling station was permitted on approval of the Board of Appeals, but the only parcels
of land so zoned were existing service station locations. After the
Town Board denied petitioners' application to rezone certain prop-

erty from Residential A to the Commercial B District, they instituted a proceeding to review the Town Board's denial under Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Act. This proceeding, which
is in the nature of certiorari, is the customary method of obtaining
judicial review of administrative or quasi-judicial determinations
in New York. 23 It was contended that the action of the Town Board
in granting or denying an application for change of zone to Commercial B District was equivalent to the granting or denial of a
special exception. The validity of the ordinance was not in issue.
The lower court dismissed the petition on the ground that it appeared on the face thereof that the denial was legislative in nature

and, therefore, not reviewable in an Article 78 proceeding. The
Appellate Division, Fourth Department, unanimously affirmed and
thereafter the New York Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal
to that court.24 As we have seen, the New York court in Tarrytown
upheld the floating zone provision by implying a parallel with a
special exception. Now we have the same court in the California
Oil Company case treating a denial of such rezoning differently

from a denial of a special exception. It would appear, therefore,

that a basic fallacy of the Tarrytown decision was the majority's

reliance on the entirely distinguishable special exception device in
upholding the floating zone legislation.
PLANNERS' CRITICISM OF TARRYTOWN

The decision in the Tarrytown case evoked a great deal of
adverse criticism on the part of professional planners. Pending
23 Since September 1, 1963, the New York Civil Practice Act and Rules
of Civil Practice have been replaced by the Civil Practice Law and Rules.
A proceeding in the nature of certiorari against a public body or officer,
formerly under Article 78 of the Civil Practice Act, is retained under article
78 of24the Civil Practice Law and Rules.
Cf. Rothstein v. County Operating Corp., 6 N.Y.2d 728, 158 N.E.2d
507, and Lemir Realty Corp. v. Larkin, 11 N.Y.2d 20, 181 N.E.2d 407. In
the latter case, the New York Court of Appeals held that "special exceptions
grants or denials, even though by a legislative body, were for court review
purposes administrative" and therefore subject to review in an article 78
proceeding; but see the Tarrytown case, 302 N.Y. at 123, 96 N.E.2d at 734:
"And-while no such question is here presented-we note that the (town)
board may not arbitrarily or unreasonably deny applications of other owners
for permission to construct garden apartments on their properties. The action
of the (town) board must in all cases be reasonable and, whether a particular application- be granted or denied, recourse may be had to the courts to
correct an arbitrary or capricious determination. E.g., Nappi v. LaGuardia, 184
Misc. 775, 781, 55 N.Y.S.2d 80, 86, aff'd 269 App.Div. 693, 54 N.Y.S.2d 722,
aff'd 295 N.Y. 652, 64 N.E.2d 716; Green Point Say. Bank v. Board of
Zoning Appeals, 281 N.Y. 534, 24 N.E.2d 319" and other cases. It is noteworthy that while the Nappi case was an action for declaratory judgment,
that of Green Point Savings Bank was an article 78 proceeding.
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appeal of that case, the Regional Plan Association (of New York)
submitted a brief amicus curiae in which it argued:
"Under the decision appealed from herein, public officials
may grant to owners the right to be relieved of zoning restrictions, not because the proposed change conforms to statutory standards but because such owners deem release from
existing restrictions to be in their private interest and public
officials believe the change will bring more tax revenue into
the public treasury ....If this is to be the law, zoning will
cease to be a protective measure for the benefit of all and
will become a happy hunting ground for official favor."
The comment of the American Society of Planning Officials
was less restrained. In their publication, Zoning Digest, they referred to the Tarrytown decision as "The Neatest Trick of The
Month,"a5 and urged that it was bad law which might lead to the
demoralization of zoning not only in New York State but throughout the country. After commenting that the legislation approved by
the Tarrytown decision was anomalous with comprehensive planning and constituted "spot zoning, whether the Court of Appeals
said so or not,"26 the planners concluded:
"...This leads to the rule of man, rather than the rule of
law. The unfortunate aspect of the whole business is that an
unscrupulous board of trustees or planning body now has an
authorized method of establishing spot zones; an authorized
legal and judicial
method through a subterfuge of evading the
27
limitations on the granting of variances."
HUFF V. BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS
The decision of the New York court in the Tarrytown case was
cited with approval by a majority of the Maryland Court of Appeals
in the case of Huff v. Board of Zoning Appeals. 28 In the latter case,
the Commissioners of Baltimore County adopted new county-wide
zoning regulations providing for a zoning classification designated
"M.R.-Manufacturing, Restricted."29 This M.R. district was to be
subsequently located by the Zoning Commissioner, rather than by
the legislative body as in the Tarrytown case, on petition of a
prqperty owner and after an advisory report of the Planning Commission. To be eligible for such a classification, the property had
to be at least five acres in area. Further requirements were provided as to height, off-street parking, etc. The purpose of the
requested change to the M.R. classification of an eighteen-acre tract
of farm land in a residence zone where only one and two-family
homes were permitted, was to permit the location of a plant for
the manufacture and assembly of precision instruments for the
25 3 ZONIN

DIGEsT 33

(1951).

26Ibjd.
27 Ibid.
28214 Md. 48, 133 A.2d 83 (1957).
29 Id. at 52, 133 A.2d at 85.
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federal government. Such relocation to a rural area was sought
to conform to federal requirements for decentralizing plants engaged in making products vital to defense. Reclassification by the
Zoning Commissioner was upheld by a divided court of the Marymajority referred to a comprehensive
land Court of Appeals. The
plan as a "general plan,"3 0 and pointed out that the language of
the Tarrytown opinion relating to court review of action of the
village board there, 31 was particularly applicable to "the discretion
of the administrative body"3 2 in the Huff case. However, the majority of the court in the Maryland case rested the decision on the
express ground that the reclassification granted by the Zoning
was analogous to the granting of a special excepCommissioner
83
tion.
The prevailing opinion of the Maryland court upheld, as being
in accordance with a comprehensive plan, an ordinance which established a new zoning district although lacking simultaneous delineation of its boundaries. To that extent this decision has been
cited in support of the floating zone concept. However, the rezoning there was accomplished by an administrative agency, rather
than by a legislative body which usually exercises the function of
amending the zoning map. The majority of the court treated alike
zoning reclassification by an administrative agency and the granting
of a special exception by such an agency. Since the floating zone
concept entails rezoning, which is a legislative act, the Huff case,
with an administrative dispensing agency, does not support the
floating zone principle in its entirety. On the other hand, vesting
an administrative agency with power of amending the zoning map
by reclassification of zones would appear to be an illegal delegation
as well as an
of legislative power by the County Commissioners
84
unsound practice from a zoning point of view.
30
31

Id. at 58, 133 A.2d. at 89.
See note 24 Supra.

32 214 Md. at 64, 133 A.2d at 92.
S3 Although subsequent Maryland rezoning cases do not deal with the
floating zone concept, it is interesting to note how differently the special

exception analogy of the Huff case has been treated. In Board of Zoning
Appeals v. Bailey, 216 Md. 536, 141 A.2d 502 (1958), the same court refused to apply the analogy to permit the use of a six-acre tract in a rural
area for a trailer park, saying that the Huff case was "exceptional." In Carole
Highlands Citizens Ass'n v. County Conn,'rs, 222 Md. 44, 158 A.2d 663
(1960), the court brushed aside appellants attempt to support the reclassification as falling within the category of a special exception, saying "The
short answer to this contention would seem to be that the proceeding was
not based on an application for special exception, but was for rezoning." In
the later case of Costello v. Sieling, 223 Md. 24, 161 A.2d 824 (1960), the
Maryland court accepted the analogy to permit a trailer park in a residential
district on the basis of compatability of uses, but still later in Overton v.
County Comm'rs, 223 Md. 141, 162 A.2d 457 (1960), the same court rejected the special exception analogy on the ground of incompatability of a
three-story building with shops and medical offices, in connection with a
home for elderly, in an area previously zoned residential.
34 See BASsETr,ZoNiNG 166 (2d ed. 1940).
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EVES V. ZONING BOARD
The leading case striking down the floating zone principle is
that of Eves v. Zoning Board of Lower Gwynedd Township.",
It involved property just beyond the outer limits of metropolitan
Philadelphia. The Supervisors of the Township adopted an ordinance which amended the general zoning ordinance by providing
for an unlocated zone designated as "F-1 Limited Industrial." 0 As
in the Maryland Huff case, this zone was created for light industry
with restrictions as to architecture, setbacks, landscaping, buffer
strips to protect adjoining areas, and a minimum lot size-in this
case, twenty five acres. The amendment also provided a procedure
for reclassification by the Supervisors on application of a property
owner and a report from the Planning Commission. Following an
application for rezoning so as to permit the construction of an industrial and sewage treatment plant covering a 103-acre tract in a
residential zone, the Supervisors adopted a second ordinance which
rezoned the property to the requested F-1 classification but reduced the area from 103 to 86 acres. The adjoining residential property owners challenged the validity of the two acts on the ground
of failure to conform to the state's enabling legislation. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania unanimously agreed with the petitioners and annulled the building permit.
Although the court did not cite either the Tarrytown case of
New York or the Huff case of Maryland, its rationale in some respects followed the reasoning of the dissenting opinions in these
two earlier cases. It was noted that the Supervisors were required
by the state enabling legislation to "implement a comprehensive
plan by enacting zoning regulations in accordance therewith" and
"to shape the land uses into districts of such number, shape and
area as may be deemed best suited to carry out the purpose of this
article."T The court pointed out that the Supervisors had confused
"comprehensive planning" with "a comprehensive plan," and said:
"The adoption of a procedure whereby it is decided which
areas of land will eventually be zoned "F-1" Limited Industrial
Districts on a case by case basis patently admits that at the
point of enactment of ordinance 28 (the floating zone ordinance involved) there was no orderly plan of particular land
use for the community. Final determination under such a
scheme would expressly await solicitation by individual landowners, thus making the planned land use of the community
dependent upon its development. In other words, the development itself would become the plan, which is manifestly the
antithesis
of zoning 'in accordance with a comprehensive
8
plan'.1
35401 Pa. 211, 164 A.2d 7 (1960).
361d. at 213, 164 A.2d at 8.
371d. at 216, 164 A.2d at 10.
38 Id. at 217, 164 A.2d at 11.
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The Pennsylvania court's rejection of the floating zone concept was based primarily on the statutory objection that the pro-

cedure was not in consonance with a comprehensive plan. Also, in
considering the device from a zoning point of view, the opinion
elaborated on certain secondary evils of this technique:
"Several secondary evils of such a scheme are cogently advanced by counsel for the appellants. It would produce situations in which the personal predilections of the supervisors

or the affluence or political power of the applicant would have
a greater part in determining rezoning applications than the
suitability of the land for a particular use from an overall
community point of view. Further, while it may not be readily
apparent with a minimum acreage requirement of 25 acies,
'flexible selective zoning' carries evils akin to 'spot zoning',
for in theory it allows piecemeal placement of relatively small
acreage areas in differently zoned districts. Finally, because
of the absence of a simultaneous delineation of the boundaries
of the new 'F-i' district, no notice of the true nature of his
vicinity or its limitations is afforded the property owner or
the prospective property owner. While it is undoubtedly true
that a property owner has no vested interest in an existing
zoning map and, accordingly, is always subject to the possibility of a rezoning without notice, the zoning ordinance and
its accompanying zoning maps should nevertheless at any
given time reflect the current planned use of the community's
land so as to afford as much notice as possible."3 9
Particularly noteworthy was the Pennsylvania court's comparison of the floating zone and the special exception, as techniques in
zoning. We have already seen that the differences between these
two devices are rooted in the philosophies, dispensing agencies, and
the standards of court review involved. Elaborating further on
these differences, the court noted that under the enabling legislaion "only the specialized township board of adjustment was empowered to permit deviations from the prevailing zoning regulations on a case by case basis" 4 0-by way of variances and special
exceptions-and according to the standards spelled out by the
local legislature. However, in the case of the floating zone ordinance, the very legislative body that established the standards
would determine compliance therewith. In this connection, it was
noted that the legislative body would not be bound by "rigid
statutory standards.., as in the case of special exceptions." 41 The
court apparently meant that the local legislature, in implementing
a floating zone ordinance, could change the standards it established. Another difference stressed by the court was the "close
89 Id.
at 217, 164 A.2d at 11.
40 Id. at 219, 164 A.2d at 12.
41 Id.at 221, 164 A.2d at 12.
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standard of court review in the very delicate area of protecting
property rights,"4 2 which was applicable to the special exception
but lacking with respect to the floating zone.
The decision of the Pennsylvania court in the Eves case received favorable comment in an article in the magazine, The American City.43 Referring to the Pennsylvania court's ruling on the

question of comprehensive plannin, as "one of the most important
zoning decisions in recent years,' 4 4 the article concluded that
the decision was "generally in line with the best in modem planning thought."45
The conformity of the Pennsylvania court's conception of a
comprehensive plan with modem planning ideas is also borne out
by an often-cited law review article4 6 which was written five years
before the Eves decision. There, Professor Haar considered at great
length the relationship between the zoning ordinance, and what
he called "its parent, the overall city plan."47 He explained the
planner's view of this relationship thus:
"To the professional planner, the dependence of zoning
upon planning is relatively simple and clear. The city master
plan is a long-term, general outline of projected development;
zoning is but one of the many tools which may be used to
implement the plan. Warnings have constantly emanated from
the planners that the two must not be confused. 'Instead of
being itself the city plan, for which unfortunately it is often
says one of the early standard works in the field,
mistaken,'
'zoning is but one of the devices for giving effect to it.' And
a recent text cautions: 'The danger is that it (zoning) ma , be
considered a substitute for city planning and that, a zoning
plan having been adopted, enthusiasm and interest 48may die
out. Zoning is not a substitute for a city plan...'"
DONAHUE V. ZONING BOARD
Whatever confusion or dissension there was about the legal
status of the floating zone concept after the Eves decision, it was
assumed that such a provision was invalid, at least in the State of
Pennsylvania. However, in the recent case of Donahue v. Zoning
42 Ibi.
43

The American City, Feb. 1961, p. 151.

44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46

Haar, In Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HAnv. L. r.v.
1154, 1156 (1955).
47 Id. at 1154.
48 Id. at 1156. To the same effect see Fornaby v. Feriola, 18 App.Div.2d
215, 219, 239 N.Y.S.2d 185, 189 (1963) where the court said: A master
plan is to be distinguished from a zoning ordinance. The former is 'a long
term, general outline of projected development,' while the latter 'is but one
of the many tools which may be used to implement the plan' (68 HAnv. L.
RIv. 1156)." Cf. Harr & Hering, Lower Gwynedd Township Case: Too Flexible Zoning or an Inflexible Judiciary?, 74 Hanv. L. RBv. 1552, 1559 (1961)
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Board of Whitemarsh Township,49 decided in October 1968, the
same Pennsylvania court took a contrary view with respect to
substantially similar ordinances involving a different land use, an
apartment house development. While the opinion does not indicate
the size of the area involved, the record50 discloses that the property consisted of thirty three acres.
The court distinguished the two cases on three points, none
of which, it is submitted, has any legal merit. In the Eves case
there was a lapse of less than ten months between the two enactments; whereas in the Donahue case less than six weeks intervened.
On this basis, the court noted "(i)n the instant (Donahue) case,
the new classification was established and the Zoning Map amended
within a very short period of time"5' and proceeded to the same
conclusion, reached by the New York court in the Tarrytown case,
2
that "these ordinances should be read together as one enactment."
Indeed, if the time span were important as bearing on the intent of
the legislators, then Eves is stronger on this point than Donahue
because the legislators in the former case enacted a rezoning
ordinance (No. 28A) on the same day that the classification ordinance 28 was adopted. However, that earlier rezoning ordinance was held invalid because of a procedural irregularity.5 This
necessitated the second rezoning ordinance, the one attacked in the
Eves case, which was enacted less than ten months after the first.
Moreover, applying this time-span criterion, we would have a situation where floating zone ordinances would appear by their terms
to be in effect, but as a matter of law they would 'have suffered
demise because of failure of implementation within a period of
time. Such uncertainty would result in chaos rather than stability
of land uses and property investments.
Another distinction made in the Donahue case was that the ordinance creating the new classification did not, by its own terms,
provide the mechanics whereby property owners could obtain
rezoning to the new classification. Referring to this procedure in
the Eves ordinance, the court said: "It was this case by case review which demonstrated the absence of a comprehensive plan."5 4
True, in Eves the court noted that the adoption of such procedure
"patently admits that at the point of enactment of ordinance 28

H-igginbothan v. City of The Village, 361 P.2d 191 (Okla. 1961), where
the city zoning map and a comprehensive zoning ordinance were considered
together
to satisfy the statutory requirement of a comprehensive zoning plan.
49
412 Pa. 332, 194 A.2d 610 (1963).
50 Brief for Appellants, p. 5a, Donahue v. Zoning Board of Wbitemarsh
Township, 412 Pa. 332, 194 A.2d 610 (1963).
51412 Pa. at 334, 194 A.2d at 611.
52 Ibid. In the Tarrytown case, a year and a half elapsed between the
two enactments. This time span was mentioned by the court there to negate
that there was spot zoning for defendant's benefit. 302 N.Y. at 124, 96 N.E.2d
at 735.
53 Sisters of Mercy v. Lower Gwynedd Township, 75 Montg. Co. L.R. 190.
54 412 Pa. at 334, 194 A.2d at 611.
also
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there was no orderly plan of particular land use for the commun5
ity."m
However, the mere omission of such procedure from the
terms of the challenged ordinance would seem to be of little, if
any, significance because every property owner has the right to
apply for rezoning whether or not the ordinance creating a new
classification specifically affords him that right. As a matter of
fact, the rezoning effected in the Donahue case was not initiated by
the legislative body but resulted from the application of a property
owner. Accordingly, all the evils of the floating zone, so forcefully
pointed out by the court in Eves-the dangers of spot zoning, the
favors by an unscrupulous
political or
for unbridled
opportunities
local
legislature,
by personal
standard court review, the absence
to a property owner of the true natre of his vicinity or
of notice
its limitations,-are all inherent in this type of ordinance whether
or not the ordinance itself expressly provides for applications thereunder. In the Donahue case, the court attributed the evils of the
Eves legislation to "the defects (which) were specifically created
by the very terms of the ordinances which set up the application
procedure. However, in the next sentence the court acknowledged
that "It is not unusual for a zoning change to be made on request
of a landowner. . . ."5 It is submitted that the court erroneously
related the evils of the Eves legislation to the application procedure
provided there, rather than to the essence of the floating zone concept itself since the omission from such legislation of provision for
applications thereunder does not eliminate the evils of the floating
zone.The remaining
distinction made by the Pennsylvania
court
was that, unlike the ordinance which it struck down in Eves, the
ordinance which established the new zoning classification in the
instant case was introduced by a declaration of intent. This introduction consisted merely of general statements of policy and pleasant-sounding cliches.5 7 The appellants argued that the ordinances
failed to comply with the definition of a "comprehensive plan" as
contained in the Township's General Zoning Ordinance. They contended that what was required was a separate document outlining
future goals in the nature of a master plan. The Pennsylvania court,
55 401 Pa. at 217, 164 A.2d at 11.
56 412 Pa. at 335, 194 A.2d at 611.
57 "The purpose of establishing planned apartment districts shall be to
encourage the logical and timely development of land for apartment purposes
in accordance with the objectives, policies, and proposals of the (Comprehensive or General) Plan for the community; to permit a variety of housing
to the landscape which conforms to the interest of the (Comprehensive or
General) plan and zoning ordinance; to assure the suitable design of the
apartment in order to protect the surrounding environment of adjacent and
nearby neighborhoods; and to insure that the proposed development will
constitute a residential environment of sustained desirability and stability and
not produce a volume of traffic in excess of the capacity for which access
streets are designed. The protective standards contained in this Article
are intended to minimize any adverse effect of the apartment or nearby
property values." 412 Pa. 332, 336, 194 A.2d 610, 612.
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nevertheless, upheld the ordinances on the basis of the "comprehensive plan" which it said was embodied in the aforesaid declaration of intent, differentiating between such a plan and a master
plan. By this distinction the court decided, in part, the question
it posed in Eves, as to how far a comprehensive plan need go in
containing the characteristics of a master plan. 8 Regardless of the
extent to which a comprehensive plan is to be equated with a
master plan, the gist of the Eves ruling was that since "the focus
of any plan is land use,"6 9 general policies had to be translated into
specific proposals with "ultimate decision of selective land uses." 0
To use other language of that opinion, "the zoning ordinance and
its accompanying zoning maps should. .. at any given time reflect
the current planned use of the community's land so as to afford as
much notice as possible."0 1 It was held in Donahue that the comprehensive plan mandated by the enabling legislation need not go
so far as a master plan indicating future goals, but the court there
failed to heed the requirement in Eves that consonance with a comprehensive plan meant, at least, fixation of current land use allocations.
In the Donahue case, the Pennsylvania court ignored its earlier
pronouncements in Eves. It seems to have taken a different approach in determining conformity with a comprehensive plan, but
without furnishing any new guidelines for such determination. The
different judicial approach in each case may be attributed to the
court's concern with the difference in the uses involved. In Eves,
the court considered an industrial and sewage-treatment plan, in
particular, and in general, the "piecemeal placement of relatively
small acreage areas in differently zoned districts."62 In Donahue,
the court was concerned with a large-scale apartment house development, just like the majority of the New York court in the
Tarrytown case was concerned with the circumstance that what
was there involved was "simply a garden apartment development."63
58 In Eves, the court said: "Just what the precise attributes of a comprehensive plan must be, or the extent to which the plan must approach a
development plan for the township formulated by a planning commission
should one exist is not now before us." The court noted that it was not clear
to what extent the township had a development plan. 401 Pa. 211, 215, 164
A.2d 7, 10. But see Harr & Hering, The Lower Gwynedd Township Case: Too
Flexible Zoning or ar Inflexible Judiciary? 74 HAv.L. BEv. 1552, 1559
(1961) where it was pointed out that other language of the court in the
Eves case could be interpreted as requiring a written plan preceding enactment of the ordinance and that such a requirement, while welcome in that
it would provide a sounder basis for judicial review, would raise practical
objections in many communities lacking such a plan. See also, The "New
Look" in Pennsylvania Zoning - Planning Comes of Age, 35 TEMP-.L. Q.
59, 66 (1961).
59 401 Pa. at 216, 164 A.2d at 10.
60 Id. at 219, 164 A.2d at 11.
61 Id.at 218, 164 A.2d at 11.
62
03

Ibid.

302 N.Y. at 126, 96 N.E.2d at 736.
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While there may be merit for different requirements for different
types of uses from a planning viewpoint it is for the state legislatures, and not for the courts, to vary these requirements by defining "in accordance with a comprehensive plan" in enabling acts. As
it now stands, we have sheer confusion, uncertainty, and instability arising from different constructions of the identical phrase by
different courts and, indeed, by the same Pennsylvania court in
the short period of three years which elapsed between the decisions
in Eves and Donahue.
"FLOATING USE" CASES
Failure to comply with the statutory requirement of conformity with a comprehensive plan was also the basis for striking down
a zoning ordinance by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Rochill
v. Chesterfield Township6 4 decided even before Eves. This suit
involved the validity of a zoning ordinance of a rural community
where the entire area was reserved for residential and agricultural
uses. The ordinance then provided for "special uses" consisting of
neighborhood business, shopping centers, gasoline service stations,
restaurants, light industrial uses, etc. The special uses" were to be
approved or disapproved by the governing body, pursuant to general standards, after a report of the Planning Commission. They
were to be subsequently located without reference to zoning diitricts. Since no change of zoning was involved, the case dealt with
what can be considered a "floating use" which hovered over the
entire community, rather than a floating zone. The New Jersey
court ruled the ordinance invalid as flouting the "essential concept
of district zoning according to a comprehensive plan".6 The court
remarked that investments are made on the basis of knowledge of,
and reliance on, district use classification, a classification that has
some degree of permanency in that it will stand until changing conditions dictate otherwise.
A late case on this subject is Summ v. Zoning Comm. of the
Town of Ridgefield.6 An amendment of the ordinance there authorized the zoning commission to issue special permits for research
laboratories in any zone, and prescribed detailed standards or requirements including a minimum tract size of 40 acres. Before anyone sought to implement the enactment by application for a special
permit, the owners of residential property challenged the validity
of the amendment, contending that it violated the principles of
sound zoning by creating a floating zone. The Connecticut court
acknowledged "the conflicts which have arisen in other jurisdictions
over the authority to establish floating zones."07 It mentioned the
6423 N.J. 117, 128 A.2d 473 (1957).
65 Id. at 127, 128 A.2d at 479.

66 150 Conn. 79, 186 A.2d 160 (1962).
67 Id. at 90, 186 A.2d at 165. It seems rather peculiar that in listing
floating zone cases the Connecticut court omitted De Meo v. Zoning Commission, 148 Conn. 68, 167 A.2d 454 (1961) and cited that case merely for the
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Rockhill case of New Jersey in this connection and noted that "in
all of the cited cases the court was considering an actual change in
zone." 68 As appears above, however, the ordinance in the Rockhill
case provided for special uses "without regard to districts,"6 so
that no change of zoning district was involved in that case either.
In distinguishing floating zone legislation, the Connecticut
court pointed out that the amendment before it did not change any
zoning boundaries but "merely adds to the list of permissible uses
in any zone a new use - that of research and development laboratories. See Nappi v. LaGuardia . . ."7 Insofar as no change of
zoning was involved, the Ridgefield case was similar to the cited
Nappi case, where a special exception was involved, and different
from Tarrytown and the other floating zone cases. In this respect,
the floating use device, partially resembling the special permit or
special exception, eliminates some of the disadvantages of the
floating zone. Because of the administrative nature of the former,
judicial review in the nature of certiorari is available and there is
less opportunity for personal or political partiality.
However, the special exception in Nappi was confined to a
specified type of district in New York City, whereas the Ridgefield
amendment applied to all districts of the town. Inherent in the
Ridgefield legislation, therefore, was the same uncertainty, the same
insufficiency of notice to present and prospective property owners,
as is characteristic of floating zone legislation.
Moreover, the floating use concept upheld in Ridgefield does
not appear to be consistent with the rationale of the special exception. We have seen that the latter device is predicated on a legislative determination of area homogeneity or general compatability
of particular uses with others permitted as of right. But because
these particular uses present special problems, harmony may not
necessarily follow at every location and under all circumstances in
certain types of zones. Accordingly, compatability is accomplished
by having the dispensing agency determine compliance with prescribed standards which are specially adapted for the particular
use in the type of zone involved. The floating use ignores district
general proposition that the courts will not substitute their discretion for that
of zoning agencies. In the De Meo case, however, the same court had, in
effect, approved the floating zone concept. Nowhere in that case is the ordinance denominated as one dealing with a floating zone, but the concept
was involved there because a new garden apartment zone was created without any specific area being designated therefor on the zoning map. In upholding the rezoning to that classification of slightly more than four acres
of vacant property previously devoted to a commercial non-conforming use,
the Connecticut court equated the comprehensive plan with the zoning regulations, concluding that the rezoning was in harmony with such plan and
therefore not spot zoning. However, the opinion there does not reflect any
consideration of the floating zone concept or the cases dealing therewith.
68 150 Conn. at 90, 186 A.2d at 165.
09 23 N.J. at 127, 128 A.2d at 479.
70 150 Conn. at 90, 186 A.2d at 165.
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zoning and its justification entails the premise that the particular
use is generally similar to, or compatible with, all others throughout
the entire community. Ordinarily at least, such a premise would
appear to be unsound from a planning standpoint.
The plaintiffs in the Ridgefield case also contended that the
amendment did not meet the statutory requirement that zoning be
in accordance with a comprehensive plan." The Connecticut court
rejected this argument, holding that the comprehensive plan was
71
"to be found in the scheme of the zoning regulations themselves"
and that the amendment was therefore valid. Accordingly, on its
facts the Connecticut Ridgefield case was similar to the New Jersey
Rockhill case in that neither involved any change of zone. Nevertheless, the interpretations given by the courts to the phrase "in
accordance with a comprehensive plan" were diametrically opposed
with consequent contrary conclusions.
Reviewing briefly the court holdings in the above cases, we
have the divided New York court upholding the floating zone concept in the Tarrytoum case, and the divided Maryland court upholding the concept in the Huff case by an unwarranted analogy
with a special exception; the unanimous Pennsylvania Supreme
Court rejecting the floating zone concept in the Eves case, and later
upholding the concept in Donahue. In addition, on the so-called
"floating use" concept, the New Jersey court in the Rockhill case
struck down the ordinance providing for special
uses without
recourt
the Connecticut
In ontraposition,
zoning districts.
gard
the same type of ordinance.
case upheld
in
thetoRidgefield
PLANNERS' MODIFIED ATTITUDE
We have
the adverse criticism by professional planners
of the floating noted
zone idea in the Tarrytown
case, and their favorable
comment concerning the rationale of the Pennsylvania court in the
Eves case where
he concept was rejected. However, since the
Tarrytown decision, the planners seem to have withdrawn some
of their opposition to implementation of the floating zone concept
in certain exceptional cases involving large-scale developments in
undeveloped areas. A cogent argument made in favor of the floating
zone for large-scale projects is that immediate mapping would be
self-defeating since the properties in the new zone would be increased in price or even taken off the market. If that happened it
would be difficult, if not impossible, to assemble large areas. So
far as any disadvantage is concerned, it is argued that in sparsely
settled areas there is little, if any, stability of land uses, so that
the advantage of the floating zone may be obtained there without
any serious adverse effect.
The Regional Planning Association of New York now takes
the position with respect to such projects that "(t)he use of the
floating zone is most appropriate perhaps . ..when the municipal71Id. at 88, 186 A.2d at 165.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol1/iss2/4

18

Mosher: The Floating Zone: Legal Status and Application to Gasoline Stati

19643

THE FLOATING ZONE

ity is lightly settled."72 In this connection, the Association pinpointed shopping centers as an example, noting:
"Floating zones are created to provide for certain uses which
eventually will be needed in the municipality but for which
specific locations cannot reasonably be determined in advance.
They are held to be useful in providing for future large-scale
uses (for instance, shopping centers) when the municipality
is not73 yet ready to single out a particular tract of land for the
use."

The American Society of Planning Officials seems also to
have relaxed its opposition to the floating zone concept in the case
of large-scale shopping center developments in suburban areas.
They observe that in fringe areas the zoning map does not represent a stabilized situation, and that this type of ordinance seems
"administratively feasible" for shopping centers although not the
"'best practice' from a theoretical standpoint." 74
The Tulsa Metropolitan Area Planning Commission in its 1959
forecast of "1975 Metropolitan Tulsa Commercial Land Needs"
recommended action to "incorporate the floating zone principle in
the revision of the Zoning Ordinance 7 5 after pointing out the following advantage of this device for shopping centers:
"Use of floating zones encourages competition among property owners. For example, where there is more than one site
proposed in the same general location and each is equally
appropriate for a needed shopping center, the competitive
effect of utilizing the floating zone (rather than favoring one
site with a mapped district) prevents an undue inflation of
the cost of acquiring the site for actual development." 76
Research has not disclosed any case in the State of Oklahoma
involving the floating zone concept. The enabling legislation of that
state provides that by zoning regulations "(t)he local legislative
body may divide the municipality into districts of such number,
shape and area as may be deemed best to carry out the purposes of
this Act,"7 7 and mandates that such regulations "shall be in accordance with a comprehensive plan."7 8 Identical language appeared
in the Standard Zoning Enabling Act recommended by the U. S.
Department of Commerce in 1926. The Model Standard Act, with
the particular requirement of conformity with a comprehensive
72

Regional Planning Ass'n, Zoning Advances in the New Jersey-New

York-Connecticut Metropilitan Area, 1956.

73 Ibid.

74 Planning Advisory Service, Information Report American Soc'y of
Planning Officials, No. 128, p. 22, Nov. 1959.

75 1975 Metropolitan Tulsa Commercial Land Needs, p. 95 (1959).
76 Id. at 92.
77 11 OKLA. STAT. § 402 (1961).
78 11 On. STAT. § 403 (1961).
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plan, has been adopted, often literally, by most states.79
If the recommendation of the Tulsa Metropolitan Area Planning Commission were implemented for shopping center development, such use of the floating zone would find support from professional planners in various parts of the country. However, under
the present wording of the state enabling legislation, the legality of
any such ordinance would depend on the approach taken by the
Oklahoma courts. The courts could choose the logical and persuasive rationale of Pennsylvania's Eves case where a floating zone
ordinance was invalidated. To the contrary, there is the much
criticized reasoning of the majority of the New York court in the
Tarrytoum case, upholding such legislation after noting that "simply
a garden apartment development" 80 was involved. Also to the contrary is Pennsylvania's recent Donahue case where the entire question was obscured rather than clarified.
Indeed, a potent argument for rejecting the majority ruling of
the Tarrytown case, even though application of the floating zone
to shopping center development may be desirable, is found in the
dissenting opinion in that case: "TZoning methods are determined
by the Legislature and not by the ingenuity of local boards of
trustees or by the courts. In short, we think the end cannot here
justify the means used."8 ' Substantially to the same effect as the
above minority view was the dissent in the Huff case. Despite the
worthy objective of the application there involved, namely the relocation of a defense plant to a rural area in accordance with governmental requirements for decentralization of such establishments,
the minority of the Maryland Court of Appeals pointed out:
"tTnerritorial distribution of uses, in accordance with a
comprehensive plan, seems to have gone by the board. I
think such a scheme is ultra vires and beyond the scope of
the enabling act. If such a departure from accepted tenents is
required by modem conditions, as contended,
it should be
82
brought about by change in the basic law."
Accordingly, without any legislative change in the Standard
Zoning Enabling Act, and in the absence of rulings by the courts,
the legal status of the floating zone concept would appear to be
uncertain.
APPLICABILITY TO GASOLINE SERVICE STATIONS
The extension of the floating zone principle to gasoline service
stations is demonstrated by a recent amendment enacted by the
Town of Brookhaven, Long Island, New York. By the basic ordi798 McQrmiux, MuNIciIAL ComPoaAnoN § 25.49 (3d ed. 1949); 1
RA TpnOF, Tim LAw AND Pi mwcN, §§ 3-2, 9-1 & vol. 2, §§ 100-1 to 100-6.

80 302 N.Y. at 126, 96 N.E.2d at 736.
81 Id.at 130, 96 N.E.2d at 738.
82 214 Md. at 68, 133 A.2d at 94, 95.
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nance of that town, its land was divided into conventional zoning
districts: several residence districts, several business districts, and
industrial districts. Prior to the amendment, gasoline service stations
were permitted as of right in light and heavy, industrial districts8 3
and, when authorized by special permit of the Board of Appeals,
in H and J-1 business districts.8 4 The authority of the Board of
Appeals to grant special permits for gasoline service stations was
qualified by certain safeguards as to required pump setbacks, restrictions on repair work, etc.
On July 15, 1963, the Town Board adopted an amendment
dealing solely with gasoline service stations.8 5 This use is no longer
permitted as of right in either of the industrial districts. The amendment has also eliminated from the basic ordinance the power of the
Board of Appeals to grant special permits for service stations in
H and J-1 business districts. Accordingly, this administrative agency
no longer has any control of special permits for service stations in
any zoning district of the town.
For the establishment of service stations exclusively, the
classification, desigamendment added a "'J' Business 5 District
nated "Gasoline Filling Station District." 6 The expressed intent
of the new classification is "to provide adequate87safeguards for the
location and siting of gasoline filling stations." The amendment
contains restrictions on repair work and requirements by way of
pump setbacks, front, side, and rear yards, curb cuts, screening,
etc. The boundaries of the new classification were not fixed in
any way, leaving for future determination the areas to be eventually classified in that zone. For its implementation, the amendment provides a procedure by way of rezoning application to the
Town Board. 8 However, as of the time of the submission of this
article, no property has been rezoned to the new classification.
Particularly noteworthy in the Brookhaven amendment is the
minimum area requirement of 20,000 square feet 89 -less than onehalf acre. The legislation which was invalidated in the Eves case
prescribed a minimum area of 25 acres - more than fifty times the
Brookhaven requirement. That case involved a rather large tract,
86 acres, but the court was apprehensive of the flexible selective
zoning principle "for in theory it allows the piecemeal placement
of relatively small acreage areas in differently zoned districts."9 0
This zoning concept, it was held, "carries evils akin to 'spot zon83
84

Boom

N. Y., BuIDnGm ZoNE OR iANCE §§ 1300, 1330.
wvEN,
N. Y., BumngN ZoNE OnDINANcE §§ 1000(c) (4),

BRooxavEN,

1100(c) (7).
The Long Island Advance, July 25, 1963.
s85
86 BoomuvEN, N. Y., BuLDING ZONE ORDINN Ca art XI-D added,

1963.
July 815,
7
88
89

BRoo HavEN, N. Y., BurILDIN ZoNE ORDiNANcE § 1190.
BnooAuvEN, N. Y., BuILDmNc ZoNE OrDINANcE § 1198B.
BRGoOAvEN, N. Y., BUMDING ZoNE ORnn NGE § 1194.

00 401

Pa. at 218, 164 A.2d at 11.
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ing"' 91 such as opportunity for favoritism, lack of notice to property
owners, and the absence of standard court review. The application
of the floating zone to small acreage areas is precisely what the
Pennsylvania court feared in Eves. Surely this criticism of the concept is even more in point when an area of less than one-half acre
is involved, as in the case of the Brookhaven amendment.
A recent spot zoning case in Pennsylvania, where the size of
the area was considered to be an important factor, is that of In Re
Glorioso's Appea 92 which was decided in January, 1964. This case
did not deal either with the floating zone concept or with rezoning,
but rather with a portion of a basic zoning ordinance. The Glorioso
spot zoning was somewhat of an unusual type. Spot zoning usually
benefits the subject property by tending to increase its value. In
this instance, the ordinance tended to diminish the value of the
property involved. Appellant applied to the Board of Adjustment
of the Borough of Verona for a variance permitting the construction
of a gasoline service station in a district which was zoned "Special"
for governmental, public, and quasi-public uses. The entire district
encompassed only about four and one-half acres which was described by the court as "a minute area of the borough."9 3 The district consisted solely of three properties, one of which was owned
by appellant. The ordinance specifically prohibited a gasoline service station in this "Special" district, and further prohibited the
Board of Appeals from permitting in such district any use other
than those allowed. In view of these limitations, the Board of Appeals decided it lacked authority to grant the variance. The lower
court agreed with this position and dismissed the appeal. However,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the order of dismissal,
holding that the ordinance, insofar as it created the "Special" district, was illegal spot zoning. The court said:
"By the creation of this 'Special' district in this small area
of land, completely surrounded by districts zoned commercial
and industrial, the Borough has singled out and created a small
'island' of severly restricted uses, despite the absence of any
differentiating relevant facts between the 'island' and the surrounding districts." 94
The invalidated portion of the Verona ordinance created only
one "small 'island' "9 by setting up a district of approximately four
and one-half acres with only three properties. Under the Brookhaven amendment, there90 may be sprinkled throughout the town
many "small 'island(s)"' of gasoline service stations, each comprising less than one-half acre, and each consisting of only one
property - the service station.
91 ibid.
92 413 Pa. 194, 196 A.2d 668 (1964).
93 Id. at 199, 196 A.2d at 672.

94 Id. at 200, 196 A.2d at 672.
95 ibid.
96 ibid.
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The Tarrytown ordinance, as well as the Whitemarsh Township
ordinance in Donahue9 7 prescribed a minimum area of as much as
ten acres- more than twenty times the Brookhaven requirement.
Area size was a basis for distinguishing the Tarrytown case in Santmyers v. Town of Oyster Bay9 s where an 18,000 square foot parcel
was rezoned for a gasoline service station. Although the floating
zone concept was not involved in the latter case, the related question of conformity with a comprehensive plan was considered. Declaring the rezoning unconstitutional, the court, per Christ, J., held
that the Oyster Bay ordinance was not "in furtherance of any comprehensive plan" and constituted spot zoning. Tarrytown, it was
pointed out, "involved a ten-acre parcel of land. It was for apartment homes ...
Advocates of the floating zone principle argue that its flexibility is administratively desirable, from a planning standpoint, for
locating shopping centers. It may well be that such a different
zoning method is appropriate for this relatively new type of facility
which has resulted from our changing pattern of living, particularly
changes in our retail shopping habits. But the considerations involved in the case of the shopping center do not apply to the service
station because:
(1) The shopping center occupies a large area while the service station site is usually less than one-half acre.
(2) The shopping center is comparatively rare; the service station is a common facility.
(3) The shopping center is usually set up in sparsely developed
areas and, by attracting thousands of patrons, generates heavy traffic at busy times; the service station is located in developed areas
where traffic already exists.
(4) The shopping center usually determines the subsequent
development of the surrounding area; the service station location
is determined by the development which it follows.2 00
(5) The shopping center may present problems as to prediction of the site; the service station presents no such problem.
Inherent in the floating zone idea is another consideration
which furnishes a potent argument against the application of this
device to the service station type of use. Since the concept contemplates only one land use, employment of such technique restricts or freezes the subject property to that one use. But the conditions which zoning is to meet are not static. In the course of
time, it may become uneconomic or undesirable to continue the
97 Supra, note 50, at p. 17a.

98 10 Misc.2d 614, 169 N.Y.S.2d 959 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
99 Id. at 616, 169 N.Y.S.2d at 961.
100 The American Society of Planning Officials has pointed out: "Generally speaking, service stations are not constructed in new and growing areas
until development reaches a point where the business potential of the area
can be estimated accurately." American Society of Planning Officials, Planning Advisory Service, Information Report No. 140, p. 8, Nov. 1960.
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service station use because of a neighborhood change, road widening, etc. Under any of these circumstances, the property owner
would not be entitled to any other use as a matter of right or by
way of a special exception, but would be compelled to seek another
rezoning amendment. On the other hand, where a service station
is established through the means of the conventional special exception, the existing zone classification permits of other conforming
uses. This distinction is academic in the case of a large-scale project such as a shopping center or multiple apartment development,
where there is little possibility of changing conditions shortening
the useful life of the project. However, in the case of the service
station it is a very real, practical consideration, and one deserving
concern since zoning should be designed to serve not only the
present, but also the long range needs of the future.
Recent authority rejecting the restrictive notion of single use
zoning is found in Pierson Trapp Company v. Peak.101 That case
involved a portion of a zoning resolution which prescribed a procedure for shopping centers, so as to "rezone the property to the
classification permitting the proposed center."102 This provision was
viewed by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky as tantamount to one
establishing a specific shopping center classification. In this connection, the court pointed out that the wording of the enabling
legislation authorizing the establishment of zones or districts meant
"zones or districts based upon classes of uses.,'un It was held,

therefore, that the zoning resolution was unconstitutional to the
extent that it required that the rezoning restrict the property to a
particular use. Said the court:
"Nowhere in the field of zoning law do we find any indication that the zoning authority may establish a zone or district
that is limited to only one particular use. Our concept of the
legitimate scope of the zoning power does not extend it to the
point of embracing the power to restrict the use 10of
4 property
other than to reasonable general classifications."
It would appear to be unrealistic to hold that a shopping center, with all the different types of stores it encompasses, is not in
fact a general classification for zoning purposes. In any event, the
Kentucky court's broad-scale disapproval of single use zoning is
particularly appropriate when applied to the gasoline service station
type of use.
For all of the above reasons, it is submitted that the application of the floating zone concept to the gasoline service station use
is contrary to sound legal and planning principles.
301340 S.W.2d 456 (Ky. 1960)
102 Id.at 459.
103
104

Ibid.
Ibid.
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CONCLUSION
Prior to zoning legislation, land use control in this country was
generally accomplished by the law of nuisance and restrictive covenants. However, neither of these controls was sufficiently satisfactory, chiefly because they both depended upon private initiative for their operation. Since early in this century, zoning regulations have removed this limitation by placing initiative in the hands
of the local legislature. The success of this kind of land use control is well attested by the widespread adoption of such zoning
ordinances throughout the country. It may well be that large-scale
developments of today and tomorrow need a different type of
control than the one that now prevails. Nevertheless, the traditional
concepts which have become deeply imbedded in our zoning ordinances should not be discarded by our courts. Our judiciary is not
the proper governmental unit to shape or promulgate a philosophy
of land use control. Nor should such a philosophy be developed on
a piecemeal, case by case basis. Herein lies a long-pending opportunity for our state legislatures. What is needed is a legislative
definition, on an overall basis, of the term "comprehensive plan".
Also needed is a legislative determination of the place in our

scheme of land use control of the new approach of the floating
zone which is predicated on private rather than governmental
initiative.
It is apparent from the cases discussed that the courts of several jurisdictions are in sharp conflict on the legality of the floating
zone concept or that of the so-called "floating use'. Such conflict
arises from different judicial interpretations of the phrase "in
accordance with a comprehensive plan" as contained in most state
enabling acts. It also appears that some planning experts, while
opposed to the principle of the floating zone and to its arbitrary
application, now recommend its implementation in the case of
large-scale developments such as shopping centers.
The conflict in judicial authority would be best resolved by
amendment of state enabling legislation so as to accommodate the
concept of the floating zone. However, it is submitted that such
accommodation should be very strictly and carefully limited to
large-scale developments of the shopping-center type, where implementation of the floating zone concept may be gainful. As to
other types of uses, including that of the gasoline service station,
the conventional zoning pattern has prevailed successfully for
many years. It affords sufficient flexibility, maintains adequate
safeguards for court review of variances and special exceptions,
and preserves stability in land uses and property investments which
zoning originally sought to protect. As to such other uses, state enabling legislation should be clarified so as to avoid possible departure from our traditional zoning pattern by way of the floating

zone concept.
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